An investigative biography of how John Paulson's hedge fund made $20 billion by shorting the U.S. housing market during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This book reveals how Paulson and his lieutenant Paolo Pellegrini identified the housing bubble, used credit default swaps to bet against it, and pulled off one of Wall Street’s greatest trades.

A historical account of the U.S. “Great Inflation” from the mid-1960s to the early 1980s, detailing the policy decisions—and missteps—that allowed inflation to become entrenched. Samuelson examines how actions under the Nixon administration fueled inflation, while the Reagan era’s monetary tightening brought painful disinflation. He also explores how the economic boom that followed in the post-1980s period fostered complacency and systemic risk, ultimately contributing to the 2008–2009 financial crisis.