This week there was lots of discussion in financial media around the CoreWeave IPO. CoreWeave provides cloud-based GPUs to AI developers. The IPO was completed today after the number of shares being sold in the IPO was reduced from 49 million to 37.5 million and the share price was lowered to $40 from the planned $47 to $55. (see here)I haven’t kept close tabs on the IPO market since my last update in October 2024 (see here), so I took a look today. Here are the updated IPO stats through March 28, 2025:

• 2025: 73

For comparison, here are prior years’ IPO stats:

• 2024: 225
• 2023: 154
• 2022: 181
• 2021: 1,035
• 2020: 480
• 2019: 232

IPO activity picked up in 2024. We were pretty much back to the 2019 level. COVID and ZIRP contributed to the 2021 IPO explosion (see here). When interest rates began rising sharply in 2022, we saw an implosion of IPO activity in 2022 and 2023.

Time will tell how receptive the market is to CoreWeave. It took almost a year before public-market investors were interested in buying technology companies that IPOed in 2023 and 2024, such as Reddit, Instacart, and Klaviyo.

CoreWeave has seen explosive growth in the last year or so because of soaring AI demand (OpenAI is one of its biggest customers). I’m sure venture capitalists and technology entrepreneurs are watching to see how receptive public-market investors are to buying the company’s shares.

I’m curious to see how CoreWeave performs and whether we’ll see more technology companies going public via IPOs in 2025.

If you want to see the latest or historical IPO stats, try here (where I get my IPO data).

Yesterday, I shared what I learned about how much of the company each Netflix cofounder owned (see here). I also learned from reading Netflix’s S-1 document that VC firm Technology Crossover Ventures (TCV) owned roughly 43% before the IPO and roughly 34% after it. I learned that TCV partner and cofounder Jay C. Hoag has been a Netflix board member since 1999 (see here). Jay and TCV invested before the IPO, so they’ve seen the company go from a promising start-up worth tens of millions to a global, publicly traded company worth over $400 billion.

I view investors who found investment firms as entrepreneurs, so I was curious to learn more about Jay and TCV. I’m early in my research, but I found Jay’s interview (listen here) from 2021 on the Invest Like the Best podcast. A few things I found interesting:

• Netflix stock traded down 15–20% after the 2002 IPO and stayed down for about six months.
• TCV was founded as a private and public (i.e., “crossover”) investor. This means that it invests in private technology companies (i.e., start-ups) and technology companies traded publicly on the stock exchanges.
• In 2011, TCV made a PIPE investment in Netflix after the stock had declined 70%. The stock traded down further after the PIPE investment, which was for $400 million, with T. Rowe Price participating, too. More details are here and here.  
• “By being a private investor, it made us better public market investors” and “By being a public market investor, it made us better private investors.”
• “The capital allocation exercise is to look across the technology landscape, take advantage of all the research and knowledge that we have, and look for the best investment . . . and not be bucketed by either private or public.”

Jay and TCV also invested in Zillow, Peloton, Facebook, Airbnb, Tripadvisor, Spotify, and many more wildly successful technology companies. I’m excited to learn more about Hoad and what led to his outsize success.

On January 7, a friend told me about a way to host an AI model on my local computer. He said it could be a cheaper alternative to running in the cloud with Google, AWS, or Azure for my software project. I told him the MVP wouldn’t be used by many people, so for now we’d host in the cloud to move faster. The company he suggested was DeepSeek, and I looked into it a bit that day. It was promising, but I decided to investigate more after my MVP is ready.

Well, on January 20, DeepSeek released a new open-source model that caused a storm in the tech community. It allegedly beats OpenAI in reasoning. This new model was reportedly created with only $6 million and significantly fewer chips for training. Other models are rumored to cost over $100 million to build and require tons of chips.

This chatter picked up significantly this weekend and caught my attention. Then, the DeepSeek app became the most downloaded app on the Apple app store this weekend. This morning the stock market took notice and sold off sharply. Bloomberg says that today, $1 trillion in value was erased for public tech companies and wealthy individuals lost over $108 billion (see here and here). NVDA alone lost roughly 17% in market value today, which means it lost over $500 billion in value in a single day (see here). That’s a record stock market drop in value of a single stock in a single day.

I haven’t played with DeepSeek yet and don’t fully understand all the implications of this open-source model performing better than OpenAI, but I’ll do some digging and have some conversations this week to learn more.

A few weeks ago, I read The Money Masters: Nine Great Investors: Their Winning Strategies and How You Can Apply Them by John Train. The book introduced me to T. Rowe Price, and I read his biography, too (more here). I really enjoyed learning a little about several people from a single book. I decided to make biographical anthologies a bigger part of my reading and discovery strategy (more here).

This week, I’m reading another book by John Train, Money Masters of Our Time, and I’ve been reintroduced to another investor I want to learn more about. Julian Robertson founded Tiger Management. I learned about him two years ago while exploring an idea for a studio for venture capital managers. During my research, I was lucky enough to get connected to someone who worked in Robertson’s back office during his heyday who explained to me how the operation ran with the Tiger Cubs.

Robertson was a successful hedge fund investor, and he also seeded and incubated tons of investors who wanted to start their own investing firms. These budding investor entrepreneurs worked out of his office and were known as the “Tiger Cubs.” The list of people Robertson helped in this way is impressive; it includes well-known investors such as Chase Coleman of Tiger Global and Philippe Laffont of Coatue Management.

I think Robertson pioneered a model of seeding and incubating budding investors that’s needed today. The model is clearly lucrative, as Robertson’s economics in the firms of some of his successful Tiger Cubs made him another fortune.

I want to learn more about Robertson, so I’m going to see if I can find a biography of him.

Over the past two years, I’ve studied countless investors who’ve had outsize success. One firm I studied was Altos Ventures. It popped up on my radar when I read the S-1 for Roblox and learned the firm had an almost 25% ownership stake when the company IPOed at a $35.5 billion valuation (see my post here). Altos’s stake was worth over $8 billion at IPO, an enormous haul for a single firm. (The Altos ownership stake can be seen on page 172 of the S-1, here. The ownership is under the name of Altos partner Anthony P. Lee, who serves on the Roblox board.)

Today, an interview of Ho Nam, an Altos founding partner, was published. I’ve watched several Ho interviews; this one was deeply personal and highlighted his struggles while building Altos. Ho described how Altos struggled for over fifteen years. The firm raised four funds and hadn’t generated meaningful returns. The partners hadn’t made any money and weren’t seeing eye to eye.

Their struggles led Altos’s three partners to change their strategy. They originally played what Ho calls the VC lotto game. They’d find promising companies early and focus on preparing them to raise the next funding round from a brand-name VC firm at a higher valuation. That strategy imploded when the dot.com bubble burst. The Altos partners realized they were playing a game they weren’t suited to win. They changed their strategy to focus on helping founders build enduring cash flow–positive businesses that didn’t require excessive venture capital funding. They focused on helping the founders create value for customers in a capital-efficient manner, not on hyping them up to later-stage VC firms.

This strategy change worked in a major way for Ho and Altos. The firm has since had several early-stage companies that each has gone on to be worth over $1 billion; a few, over $10 billion. The firm still owns a stake in Roblox, although it’s been distributing shares to LPs since the IPO, likely for liquidity reasons. As of this writing, Roblox has a market cap (valuation) of almost $42 billion. Coupang is another company Altos invested in early, and that company is publicly traded with a market cap of over $40 billion as of this writing.

Here are a few of my takeaways from Ho’s interview:

• Everyone can’t play every game. Figure out what game you can play and win. Play that game, even if it’s not popular at the time. Winning fixes everything, and you’ll look like a genius in the end.
• Struggle is often a prerequisite to outsize success. The painful times force you to evaluate why things aren’t working, hopefully leading to changed behavior. The wisdom gained during struggle leads to better decision-making, which is required for outsize success.
• Companies exist to add value to customers. You add value to customers by solving their problems. Focus on solving the customer’s problem and capital to grow your company is less likely to be an issue.
• The best founders are capital efficient. Constraints force creativity, which leads to better solutions for customers. Raising too much money leads to loose spending, which leads to founders focusing on raising capital from investors, not solving their customers’ problems.
• Control matters a lot for founders. If you’re constantly raising rounds of capital, you're losing control, and your board could fire you.

I enjoyed this interview, which contains nuggets of wisdom for founders and investors to learn from. If you want to watch this section of the interview, you can find it here. You can watch the entire interview here.

Note: Roblox is probably one of Altos’s most capital-efficient portfolio companies. Ho shared on X (formerly Twitter) that Roblox raised only roughly $10 million in funding to get to cash flow positive. All other capital raised was for secondaries (to buy shares from other investors) or to put on the company’s balance sheet.

The book The Money Masters: Nine Great Investors: Their Winning Strategies and How You Can Apply Them by John Train introduced me to Thomas Rowe Price Jr. (aka T. Rowe Price). I’m familiar with the investment firm bearing his name but not the man himself. I wanted to learn more, so I’m reading T. Rowe Price: The Man, the Company, and the Investment Philosophy by Cornelius Bond.

The book says that Price was one of the first investors to recognize the value of growth investing and adopt it as a strategy. After the Depression began, many people focused on preserving capital, so bonds were popular. In 1934, he recognized that the largest fortunes in the country had been created by owning growing businesses. He developed an investment strategy based on this insight and pitched the investment firm he was working for to test the approach.

With the country still feeling the Great Depression, the firm turned him down. Frustrated and having conviction about his approach, Price quit in 1937 to launch his investment firm, which would become T. Rowe Price Group.

After reading several biographies about famous investors, I’ve noticed that they all came to similar realizations about their investment approaches: investing in growing businesses is the key to outsize returns (Price’s biography details why this works so well). However, how these investors executed their strategies and built their firms varies drastically. Price built a firm that made decisions by committee and was paid by fees from customer accounts. Buffett created a decentralized conglomerate (after he shuttered his investment partnership) and increased his wealth through equity ownership in the conglomerate.

There’s more than one way to capitalize on an insight, as the stories of these investors prove. The most important thing is doing so in a way that aligns with the beliefs of the founder of the investment firm (or the investor, if they’re independent).

This weekend, I shared with a friend what I learned about psychology from rereading The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom. One of the things he found interesting was the concept of impetuosity and how it negatively impacts investors.

Impetuosity is the tendency to act quickly, without thinking about the consequences. It can be considered a casino mentality—an itch to go into action. You get caught up in what other people are doing and place a bet or make an investment without taking time to think it through.

Impetuosity can result in investors making bets when the probabilities are against them, upsides are low, and downside risks are high.

This section of the book reminded me of 2020 and 2021. ZIRP made investors comfortable paying high valuations for a growth company. Early-stage venture capital deals were getting done in a few days with limited diligence. In 2022 and 2023, companies that raised at these high valuations and didn’t grow into them struggled to raise capital. Some raised down rounds with brutal terms. Some didn’t make it.

Looking back, it was a period of impetuosity. Investors were doing deals they otherwise wouldn’t have because of what other investors were doing. Founders were raising at sky-high valuations because other founders were. Many didn’t think about the long-term consequences. They were caught up in the hype, doing what seemed normal.

Some founders and investors were aware of impetuosity and recognized what was happening. They took note and acted differently. The shrewd investors were selling assets at peak prices, not buying. And the shrewd founders were raising reasonable sums at valuations that wouldn’t hinder future fundraising, or they were selling their companies outright at peak multiples.

Hagstrom details how Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger avoided impetuosity. The most important thing they did before making an investment was calculate the probability that it would be favorable for them. If it wasn’t favorable, they continually took in more information and monitored the situation. They had the patience to wait until the odds were in their favor, which reduced their risk of losing money. And if the odds tilted in their favor, their research and calculated probability gave them the confidence to bet big even when others were doing the opposite.

Their use of facts and probabilities helped them act counter to the crowd and overcome impetuosity.

I’m wrapping up The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom for the second time. The first time I read it last year, I got a ton of information about the mechanics of how Warren Buffett invests. This time, I’ve gotten just as much, but more around psychology and mindset. It’s interesting how the book hasn’t changed, but what I got from it changed because what I’m interested in has changed.

The book helped me understand how a rational temperament is Buffett’s main competitive advantage. Here’s a passage that stuck with me:

The cornerstone of rationality is the ability to see past the present and analyze several possible scenarios, eventually making a deliberate choice. That, in a nutshell, is Warren Buffett.

Speaking to students at the University of Seattle, Buffett was asked how he got where he is and how he amassed such a large fortune. His response was thought provoking:

Buffett took a deep breath and began:

How I got here is pretty simple in my case. It is not IQ, I’m sure you will be glad to hear. The big thing is rationality. I always look at IQ and talent as representing the horsepower of the motor, but that the output—the efficiency with which the motor works—depends on rationality. A lot of people start out with 400-horsepower motors but only get 100 horsepower of output. It’s way better to have a 200-horsepower motor and get it all into output.

So why do smart people do things that interfere with getting the output they’re entitled to? It gets into the habits and character and temperament, and behaving in a rational manner. Not getting in your own way. As I have said, everybody here has the ability absolutely to do anything I do and much beyond. Some of you will, and some of you won’t. For those who won’t, it will be because you get in your own way, not because the world doesn’t allow you.

I’ve always thought high IQ is an edge. High mental acuity is genetic—you were either born with it or weren’t. But Buffett makes a great point about the efficiency with which someone uses their mental acuity materially impacting their output. You don’t have to be the smartest to win; you just need to avoid acting illogically.

You can’t change your IQ, but you can learn to think and act more rationally. This is a superpower hiding in plain sight. It’s something that everyone can do, but as with many superpowers hiding in plain sight, many people won’t.

Buffett built a fortune buying and overseeing businesses by being rational (he’s also pretty sharp). Entrepreneurs of all IQ levels should take note of his simple, but not easy, strategy and borrow a page from the Buffett playbook. Being rational and not shooting yourself in the foot is something everyone can do. It trumps intelligence in the long run and can lead to outsize success.

Some passages in The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom reminded me of this post from a few months ago. I shared that taxes are a successful entrepreneur’s biggest expense. Allocating appropriate time to optimizing that expense, just as entrepreneurs do with all other major expenses, can have a material impact on a company’s ability to reinvest in growth opportunities. Here are the passages:

Except in the case of nontaxable accounts, taxes are the biggest expense that investors face—higher than brokerage commissions and often higher than the expense ratio of running a fund.

In a nutshell, the key strategy involves another of those commonsense notions that is often underappreciated: the enormous value of the unrealized gain. When a stock appreciates in price but is not sold, the increase in value is an unrealized gain. No capital gains tax is owed until the stock is sold. If you leave the gain in place, your money compounds more forcefully.

Overall, investors have too often underestimated the enormous value of this unrealized gain—what Buffett calls an “interest-free loan from the Treasury.” To make his point, Buffett asks us to imagine what happens if you buy a $1 investment that doubles in price each year. If you sell the investment at the end of the first year, you would have a net gain of $0.66 (assuming you’re in the 34 percent tax bracket). Let’s say you reinvest the $1.66 and it doubles in value by the second year-end. If the investment continues to double each year, and you continue to sell, pay the tax, and reinvest the proceeds, at the end of 20 years you have a net gain of $25,200 after paying taxes of $13,000. If, instead, you purchase a $1 investment that doubles each year and is not sold until the end of 20 years, you would gain $692,000 after paying taxes of approximately $356,000.

This is a great mathematical example demonstrating the power of compounding and the impact taxes can have on investment returns over a long period. It reminded me that playing the long game in investing gives you twin tailwinds, which can lead to explosive results.

I’m rereading The Warren Buffett Way by Robert Hagstrom. I enjoyed this book last year, and I decided to read it again after reading Hagstrom’s book Warren Buffett: Inside the Ultimate Money Mind.

The book contains lots of insightful information about Buffett’s investing approach and how he thinks about capital allocations as the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway. One part of the book I found invaluable was the chapter called “Common Stock Purchases.” In this chapter, Hagstrom walks through Buffett’s process to analyze and value nine of his biggest investments: GEICO, Capital Cities/ABC, Coca-Cola, and others.

Many people are familiar with Buffett’s investing strategy, but how he applied it when making investment decisions isn’t always clear. Hagstrom explains how Buffett valued each company and compares his valuations to the prices he paid. He walks through the math and shows how Buffett’s investments were made for prices below the intrinsic values that Buffett calculated. Buying for less than intrinsic value is core to his strategy of investing only when there’s a margin of safety.

I noticed that Buffett sometimes broke his own rules, such as when he invested in GEICO. Buffett usually invests only in companies with a consistent operating history that are generating increased free cash flow. However, when he invested significantly in GEICO in 1976, the company was on the verge of bankruptcy, had zero earnings, and needed a turnaround. Over several years, Buffett bought roughly 33% of the company. Hagstrom does a great job of detailing why he made this seemingly risky investment. Needless to say, Buffett was right, as GEICO is now a household name. This example reinforces that rules sometimes need to be broken when great investing opportunities present themselves. It also shows how Buffett spent decades preparing for this investment by reading and learning about insurance, and how that preparation positioned him to act swiftly when he needed to.