I’ve been following the WeWork story for the last few months (see here and here). In August, the company, in a quarterly filing, warned of doubt the business could continue. Today it officially filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, with $19 billion in liabilities and assets worth $15 billion listed in its filing.

Chapter 11 bankruptcy doesn’t mean the company will cease operations. Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code allows a company to reorganize and renegotiate its debts with creditors while it continues to operate. The hope is that the company will be able to exit bankruptcy with a more reasonable debt load.

Today marks another low point for a well-known, venture capital–backed company that raised over $22 billion in equity and debt financing over the years and was valued at $47 billion as recently as 2019.

I’m curious to see how this bankruptcy process will play out and what the company will look like if it successfully exits bankruptcy.

Yesterday I shared definitions of three kinds of leverage from Joel Greenblatt, founder of Gotham Asset Management. One of them was investment leverage by borrowing. This involves using debt or borrowed capital to increase an investor’s capital base, which allows them to deploy more capital into an investment. If an investor were limited to investing using only personal capital, they’d likely be using a materially smaller capital base to make investments (if they were investing at all).

Venture capital funds are examples of investment leverage by borrowing. General partners (GPs) raise a fund from limited partners (LPs). Essentially, the GP borrows capital from LPs with the goal of repaying it, plus a share of the profits, in the future. Fund GPs will usually contribute personal capital that amounts to around 1% to 2% of the total fund. This is called the GP commitment.

So, if a $25 million fund is raised, the GPs will commit $500k (assuming a 2% GP commitment). The other $24.5 million is essentially borrowed from LPs.

Investing $500k of your personal money is quite different from investing $25 million of your and other people’s money. The deals you evaluate and can participate in look drastically dissimilar.

There are other aspects of GP and LP economics and relationship that I won’t get into here. But this demonstrates how a venture capital fund is essentially a vehicle that allows a venture capital investor to use investment leverage by borrowing to increase their capital. If the fund is successful and generates returns, the GP will personally receive significantly bigger returns from their investments that they would if they used only their personal capital. That’s leverage at work.

I’ve been having conversations with friends about leverage. One thing I’ve picked up on is that leverage doesn’t mean the same thing to everyone. With a little digging, I found definitions used by Joel Greenblatt, founder of Gotham Asset Management, that I think are pretty accurate:

• Financial leverage – The amount of debt a company has taken on relative to its equity. It can lead to higher returns for shareholders if the company can earn a higher return on the money borrowed than it cost to borrow it.
• Investment leverage by borrowing – Money borrowed by an investor for the purpose of purchasing an investment.
• Investment leverage by contract – A payment by an investor of a (relatively) small amount up front to purchase the right to purchase an asset later.

These are straightforward ways to think about what leverage is. We can see, thinking about these definitions, that a lot of people and companies use leverage in some form or fashion.

Today, the Wall Street Journal reported that Waystar, a healthcare payments software company, has postponed its initial public offering (IPO). The company is in a late stage of the IPO process—it was scheduled to launch its roadshow to pitch potential investors this week, and it’s normal to see a company do its roadshow a week or two before a public listing.

From what I can tell, Waystar is majority owned by private equity firms and was last valued at $2.7 billion in 2019.

This has been a lackluster IPO year, and this postponement is another sign of how challenging things may be for the rest of the year. I’m curious to see how many IPOs are completed in 2023 and what creative ways private equity and venture capital fund managers come up with to get liquidity if the IPO market remains depressed.

A few months back, I shared that WeWork had issued a dire warning in its quarterly financial filing: “substantial doubt exists about the Company’s ability to continue as a going concern.”

Today, the Wall Street Journal reported that WeWork is planning to file for chapter 11 bankruptcy. To be fair, it hasn’t filed yet, and something could happen to allow it to avert bankruptcy and continue to operate.

Regardless, this is a stunning fall for a well-known, venture capital–backed company. Crunchbase says that the company has raised over $22 billion in equity and debt financing over the years. Its valuation peaked in 2019, when it raised a reported $6 billion from Softbank at a $47 billion valuation. When I shared the dire-warning post on August 9, 2023, the company had a market capitalization (i.e., valuation) of $272 million. As of today, October 31, 2023, it’s worth $120 million. From $47 billion to $120 million in roughly four years is a staggering valuation drop.

I’m curious to see what happens next with WeWork and if it will impact investor and founder sentiment.

A few months back, I shared some stats on initial public offerings (IPOs). I’d learned that 2021 had the highest number of IPOs (1,035) in more than twenty-five years. The next year it dropped off a cliff; 181 IPOs were completed in 2022.

We have right at two months remaining in 2023, and I wanted to see how IPO activity this year stacks up. As of today, we’ve seen 131 IPOs. For context, the lowest number of IPOs since the great financial crisis, 133, was in 2016. This year will likely end up with the second-lowest number of IPOs in that period.

I view IPOs as an indicator of public-market investor sentiment. The data shows that sentiment has gone from one extreme in 2021 to the other in 2023. 

If you want more data on annual IPO activity, take a look here.

Today I was reading a transcript of an interview of a successful investor. He casually mentioned a generally accepted investing principle that he’s observed to be invalid over many years of investing. He went on to say that he believes many investors don’t understand that this principle isn’t true or the impact of that fact.

This caught my attention because another investor, someone who’s well regarded and well known, briefly mentioned something similar in an old interview I dug up. When two or more credible people have reached the same conclusion, it’s contrary to what others believe, and it hasn’t been noticed or discussed (that I know of), that’s something I take note of and want to investigate further. 

I’m curious to understand their insights that led to this contrarian perspective and will dive into this more.  

A friend recently asked about posts I wrote two months ago summarizing the IPO filings of Instacart and Klaviyo. Specifically, he asked why I spent time reading through hundreds of pages for each company. Couldn’t I have gotten the same understanding from reading summary articles in the financial press—the Wall Street Journal or Bloomberg?

I wanted to determine the strength of each underlying business for myself before they went public. Whenever I’m evaluating something, I aim to come to my own conclusions. Therefore, I try to find first-source data, not interpretations by people removed from the situation. These filings, while long, were great first-source data. They laid out facts and numerical data relevant to all facets of each business, helping me to reach a conclusion about each company with a high degree of conviction. 

I could have saved time by reading summaries in the financial press or listening to the opinions of others. But I wouldn’t have had as good an understanding of each business, might have missed critical things because others overlooked them, and wouldn’t have had strong conviction in the evaluation of each business because I hadn’t done the work myself. 

Howard Marks is a successful billionaire investor who cofounded Oaktree Capital in 1995. As of today, Oaktree has over $170 billion in assets under management, more than 1,000 employees, and offices worldwide.

Marks is known as a shrewd investor and for sharing his insights on financial matters in widely read memos since 1990. It’s said that many notable investors, including Warren Buffett, look forward to reading these memos.

Marks recently released a new memo entitled Further Thoughts on Sea Change. The piece is a follow-up to a memo he wrote in 2022. In the most recent memo, Marks makes the point that a “significant” reallocation of capital to credit is warranted for these reasons:

• Returns on credit are competitive versus historical returns on equities
• Returns on credit exceed the returns required for actuarial assumptions (this is a big deal for pensions and insurance companies, who allocate enormous capital pools)
• Returns on credit are contractual and therefore less uncertain than equity returns

If Marks is correct and we are indeed going through a sea change resulting in significantly more capital being allocated to credit, public equities (i.e., the stock market), venture capital, and various other asset classes could be materially impacted.

More demand for credit could result in less demand for other asset classes. If there’s less demand for public equities, that could result in lower market capitalizations (i.e., valuations) of public companies.

Venture capital firms often aim to sell their companies to public investors by taking them public (i.e., listing them on the stock market). Lower public market capitalizations would mean that venture capital firms would be selling companies for lower prices. Lower sales prices would decrease the probability of venture capital funds generating returns that would justify the illiquidity and risk taken relative to other asset classes. This could make limited partners less inclined to allocate capital to venture capital firms (we’re seeing this already), which, over time, could result in less capital being allocated to high-growth start-ups. 

No one can predict the future, but it’s interesting to think about what could happen if Marks’s insights are accurate.

Marks’s memos are great reads, and I see why people look forward to them. He makes a lot of salient points in this recent memo. If you’re interested in it, you can read or listen to it here and here.

I’ve been thinking about a Warren Buffett quote:

I am a better investor because I am a businessman, and a better businessman because I am an investor.

Founders may not realize it, but they’re resource and capital allocators. Their goal is to operate a successful and growing business. They must figure out the appropriate allocation of resources and capital to achieve that goal. If founders allocate capital and resources to uses that provide low or no return, the business could fail. If they allocate to uses with a high return, the business is successful.

The question I’ve been wondering about is whether Buffett’s experience is true more broadly. Do operators with a track record of success have a higher probability of investing successfully across various asset classes (not just venture capital)? Meaning, are they more likely than investors who aren’t operators to find the best uses of capital across various asset classes and generate higher returns?

I think operators are the best allocators of capital for venture capital, but I’m not sure about other asset classes. That’s something I want to think about more.